Decisions: Темелни права

In a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Supreme Court of Austria asked the ECJ if a provision of national law under which no allowance in lieu of paid annual leave is payable in respect of the current last working year, where the worker unilaterally terminates (“withdraws from”) the employment relationship early without cause, is compatible with Article 31(2) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 7 of Directive 2003/88 concerning certain aspects of the organisation of working time and if the answer is negative, if it is necessary to verify additionally if the worker was unable to use up his or her annual leave. ECJ responded that Article 7 of Directive 2003/88/EC read in the light of Article 31(2) of the Charter must be interpreted as precluding a provision of national law under which no allowance is payable in lieu of paid annual leave not taken in respect of the current and last year of employment, where the worker unilaterally terminates the employment relationship early and without cause. It is not necessary for the national court to verify whether the worker was unable to take the leave to which he or she was entitled.

In a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Specialised Criminal Court in Bulgaria asked the ECJ whether a national law, which does not provide for any procedural remedy for errors and omissions in the content of the indictment which prejudice the right of the accused person to know what he or she is accused of, after the end of the first hearing in a criminal case (pre-trial hearing), is compatible with Article 6(3) of Directive 2012/13 on the right to information in criminal proceedings and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and if the answer to that question is in the negative: would an interpretation of the national provisions governing amendment of the charges that allows the prosecution service to rectify those substantive ambiguities and shortcomings in the indictment at the hearing, so as to take proper and effective account of the accused person’s right to be informed of the accusation, be in keeping with the aforesaid provisions and with Article 47 of the Charter, or would it be in keeping with those provisions to refrain from applying national legislation prohibiting the staying of court proceedings and referral of the case back to the public prosecution service with directions to draft a new indictment. ECJ responded that the two aforementioned provisions must be interpreted as precluding national legislation which does not provide for a procedural means of remedying, errors and deficiencies in the indictment which prejudice the right of the accused person to be provided with detailed information about the charges following the pre-trial hearing in a criminal case. Furthermore, they must be interpreted as requiring the referring court to give an interpretation of the national rules on the amendment of the charges, as far as possible in a manner consistent with that law, so as to enable the prosecutor to remedy errors and omissions in the content of the indictment at the trial, while at the same tim

In a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Supreme Administrative Court of Bulgaria asked ECJ to determine whether it is permissible for a person without the ability to see to be able to work as a juror and participate in criminal proceedings, or is the specific disability of a permanently blind person a characteristic which constitutes a genuine and determining requirement of the activity of a juror, the existence of which justifies a difference of treatment and does not constitute discrimination based on the characteristic of “disability”. ECJ interpreted Council Directive 2000/78/EC establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation in light of Articles 21 and 26 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, thus establishing that it is precluded that a blind person be totally deprived of any possibility of performing the duties of a juror in criminal proceedings.

In a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Constitutional Court of Italy asked the ECJ if Article 34 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is applied to childbirth and maternity allowances and is EU law therefore to be interpreted as precluding national legislation which fails to extend the abovementioned benefits, which are already granted to foreign nationals holding a long-term resident’s EU residence permit, to foreign nationals who hold a single permit under that directive. ECJ responded that under Article 34(1) of the Charter, the EU recognises and respects the entitlement to social security benefits and social services providing protection in cases such as maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and in the case of loss of employment, in accordance with the rules laid down by EU law and national laws and practices. In addition, under Article 34(2) of the Charter, everyone residing and moving legally within the EU is entitled to social security benefits and social advantages in accordance with EU law and national laws and practices. Thus, national legislation which excludes third-country nationals from entitlement to a childbirth allowance and a maternity allowance provided for by that legislation is precluded.

The European Commission initiated proceedings before the ECJ regarding the new disciplinary regime for judges in Poland. This regime subjects judges to disciplinary investigations, proceedings and sanctions based on the content of their rulings. By the judgment in this case, the ECJ reaffirmed that the independence of the judicial system in Poland had deteriorated and the obligations contained in Article 19 (1) TEU had been violated. According to ECJ, Article 47 of the Charter must be duly taken into consideration for the purpose of interpreting Article 19(1) TEU, because it guarantees that everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously established by law.

In a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Regional Court in Linz, Austria asked the ECJ to interpret Article 11 of Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term residents, Article 2 of Council Directive 2000/43/EC implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin and Article 21 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. ECJ responded where use has been made of the option to apply the derogation provided for in Article 11(4) of Directive 2003/109, Article 21 of the Charter is not intended to apply to legislation of a Member State under which the grant of housing assistance to third-country nationals who are long-term residents is subject to the condition that they provide proof, in a form specified by that legislation, that they have a basic command of the language of that Member State, if that housing assistance does not constitute a ‘core benefit’ within the meaning of Article 11(4) of that directive. If the housing assistance in question does constitute such a core benefit, Article 21 of the Charter, in so far as it prohibits any discrimination based on ethnic origin, does not preclude such legislation.

The request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Attunda District Court of Sweden asked the ECJ if a strike by airline pilots who are employed by an air carrier and who are needed to carry out a flight constitute an “extraordinary circumstance” within the meaning of Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 establishing common rules on compensation and assistance to passengers in the event of denied boarding and of cancellation or long delay of flights. ECJ responded that the right to take collective action, including strike action, is a fundamental right laid down in Article 28 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and that right is protected in accordance with EU law and national laws and practices, hence the fact that workers invoked the right to strike and consequently launched strike action must be regarded as foreseeable for any employer, in particular where notice of the strike is given. Finally, ECJ interpreted Article 5(3) of Regulation (EC) No 261/2004 as meaning that strike action which is entered into upon a call by a trade union of the staff of an operating air carrier, in compliance with the conditions laid down by national legislation, in particular the notice period imposed by it, which is intended to assert the demands of that carrier’s workers and which is followed by a category of staff essential for operating a flight does not fall within the concept of an ‘extraordinary circumstance’ within the meaning of that provision.

In a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Supreme Court of the Slovak Republic asked the ECJ if the phrase “shall relieve the competition authorities of the Member States of their competence to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU” in the first sentence of Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 101 and 102 TFEU means that the authorities of the Member States lose their powers to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and if Article 50 (Right not to be tried or punished twice in criminal proceedings for the same criminal offence) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union also applies to administrative offences consisting of the abuse of a dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 TFEU for which the Commission and the authority of a Member State have imposed sanctions separately and independently in the exercise of their competence under Article 11(6) of Regulation No 1/2003. ECJ responded that Article 11(6) of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 must be interpreted as meaning that the competition authorities of the Member States are relieved of their competence to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in the case where the European Commission initiates proceedings for the purposes of adopting a decision finding an infringement of those provisions in so far as that formal act relates to the same alleged infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, committed by the same undertaking or undertakings on the same product market or markets and the same geographical market or markets during the same period or periods as those concerned by the proceeding or proceedings previously brought by those authorities. Furthermore, the principle ne bis in idem, as enshrined in Article 50 of the Charter must be interpreted as meaning that it applies to infringements of competition law, such as the abuse of a dominant position referred to in Article 102 TFEU, and precludes an undertaking

In a request for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal of the United Kingdom asked the CJEU to interpret Article 1(3) and Article 15(1) of Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector, read in the light of Article 4(2) TEU and Articles 7 and 8 and Article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Court first, ruled that EU law applies every time a national government forces telecommunications providers to process data, including when it is done for the purposes of national security. Second, it concluded that EU law sets out privacy safeguards regarding the collection of data by national governments, which countries must follow.